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ABSTRACT: Francis et al. (1999) and Becker et al. (1998) report evidence that audit quality 
acts as a constraint on both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management 
in public firms. These results raise several interesting questions. First, are incentives for and 
constraints on earnings management independent of whether earnings are above or below 
target? Second, does audit quality also restrain earnings management in private firms  as it 
does in public firms?  Third,  does public ownership itself act as a  constraint on earnings 
management? One could argue that, relative to private ownership, public ownership increases 
the scrutiny of a  firm's financial statements which may in tum restrain a  firm's earnings-
management behavior. 
Accordingly, we study publicly available financial statements of  a matched sample of  public 
and private Belgian firms.  Following Francis et al.  1999, DeFond and Subramanyam 1998, 
Becker et al.  1998, we use discretionary accruals as a measure of  earnings management. One 
finding is that audit quality and public ownership act as constraints on income-decreasing 
earnings management. We also find that, to a large extent, public ownership and auditor type 
are substitutes: for example, a  firm that is both public and big-6-audited typically does not 
show  more  restraint  in  earnings  management  than  a  firm  that  has  only  one  of these 
characteristics. Lastly, we do not have any evidence that audit quality and public ownership 
constrain income-increasing earnings management. 
Thus, our study contributes to the literatures on audit quality differentiation and especially 
earnings management. First, we provide supportive evidence of audit quality differentiation 
between Big 6  and non-Big 6  auditors in the private clients segment of the audit market. 
Second, we provide evidence on differences in the level of discretionary accruals between 
public and private firms. 
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Stakeholders are interested in the fmancial performance of  the firms they are dealing with and 
accounting numbers are an important summary statistic of  performance. As the magnitude of 
earnings is affected by accounting decisions, an interesting question is whether firms 
"manage" earnings through such decisions and what determines earnings management. The 
vast majority of studies on earnings management focus on incentives for and constraints on 
earnings management by listed firms. Prior evidence is supportive of  the following incentives 
of earnings management: explicit (such as bonus plans and debt covenants) and implicit 
contractsl, capital markets and need for external fmancing2, the political and regulatory 
process3 and some specific circumstances (such as labour union contract negotiations, proxy 
contests and earnings decreases or lossest. As to constraints of earnings management the 
evidence is supportive of: managerial and institutional ownership, audit committees, audit 
quality and internal governance mechanisms such as the size of  the board of directors5• 
In this study we investigate whether audit quality and public ownership are 
constraints on the level of earnings management and how these constraints interact. As prior 
studies focused on listed companies, little is known about the impact of  public ownership on 
earnings management, and the incentives for and constraints on earnings management in non-
listed companies. We follow Trueman and Titman (1988) and argue that firms avoid 
deviations in reported earnings to influence stakeholders' perception of the variability of 
economic earnings. Therefore we expect and find that income-increasing earnings 
management occurs in case firms have pre-managed ea..rnings that are lower than prior year 
reported earnings, and income-decreasing earnings management in the opposite case. 
Conditional on the direction of the earnings management incentive, we then formulate 
hypotheses on the impact of audit quality and public ownership on earnings management. 
Discretionary accruals are used as a measure for earnings management in this study. Our 
results indicate that both audit qUality and public ownership work as constraints on the level 
of income-decreasing earnings management, but that they have no incremental impact over 
one another (that is, the interaction between the two constraints is negative). This indicates 
2 that the joint impact of  both constraints is not larger than the impact of either constraint 
separately. We do not find evidence supportive of a constraining effect of audit quality and 
public ownership on the level of income-increasing earnings management. 
Our paper addresses some interesting questions such as: (1) is there evidence of audit 
quality differentiation for non-listed firms and does it differ from the existing evidence for 
listed firms, and (2) what is the impact of  public ownership on earnings management? To our 
knowledge, these questions have not been empirically addressed in prior studies. First we 
contribute to the literature on audit quality differentiation, as our study provides evidence on 
the impact of the appointment of  a Big 6 auditor on earnings management in non-listed firms. 
We report evidence of quality differentiation between Big 6 and non Big 6 auditors in non-
listed firms when they are confronted with income-decreasing earnings management. 
However, we do not find evidence of audit quality differentiation between both types of 
auditors when they are confronted with income-increasing earnings management, even for 
listed firms. The latter result contradicts prior evidence of  audit quality differentiation in listed 
companies (see, for example, Francis et al. 1999, and Becker et al.  1998). 
Second, we contribute to the earnings management literature as we provide evidence 
on differences in the level of earnings management between listed and non-listed firms. Prior 
studies used the results of  an experiment (Cloyd, Pratt and Stock 1996) or a questionnaire 
(pennon and Simon 1986) and were confmed to testing differences in accounting procedure 
choices. As earnings management through accrual decisions is less visible, it might well be 
that it is used more extensively than earnings management through accounting procedure 
choices. Unlike those prior studies we did not use American data, but Belgian data, because 
financial statement data are not publicly available for non-listed firms in the US, but they are 
in Belgium6. This enables us to study discretionary accruals as a measure of  earnings 
management. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the hypotheses that are 
tested in this paper. In the third section, we discuss the sample and the data. In section four we 
3 present our empirical models. We discuss our results in section five. ill  the final section we 
conclude the paper. 
2. Research Hypotheses 
We Tlfst argue that firms have incentives to avoid large variability in reported income 
numbers and engage in income smoothing irrespective of the fact whether they are publicly or 
privately held. Then, conditional on whether firms have an incentive to engage in income-
increasing or income-decreasing earnings management strategies, we develop hypotheses on 
two viable constraints on earnings management behavior, namely audit quality and public 
ownership. 
A  voidance of  deviations in reported earnings as an incentive for earnings management 
Due to separation between ownership and control inherent in corporate ownership structure, 
earnings management opportunism is widely assumed to be applicable to publicly listed 
companies (see; for example, Francis et al.  1999). The empirical evidence is supportive of 
accruals management by listed firms in order to smooth income (see, for example, Healy 
1985, Gaver et aI.  1995, DeFond and Park 1997, Young 1998). We believe that avoidance of 
large variability in reported income numbers is also a valid incentive for earnings 
management in non-listed privately held firms. Our belief is based on Trueman and Titman's 
(1988) argument that firms may avoid deviations in reported earnings to influence 
stakeholders' perception of the variability of the underlying economic earnings, and so their 
assessment of the probability of bankruptcy of a firm. This might then influence the terms of 
trade of a Trrm with its various stakeholder groups such as customers, suppliers, short-term 
creditors and employees. Hence, we expect that both listed and non-listed firms have 
incentives to manage earnings opportunistically to avoid variability in reported earnings, 
albeit for (partially) different reasons. ill  non-listed firms smoothing occurs as an attempt to 
influence relations with various stakeholders, whereas in listed Tlfrns it also, or mainly, 
4 happens to influence market value. Our expectation is borne out by the tests performed later 
on in this paper. 
The impact of  audit quality and pub6c ownership on earnings management 
IT firms indeed have incentives to smooth income, they will engage in income-increasing 
earnings management when pre-managed earnings are below last year's reported earnings, 
whereas the opposite will occur when pre-managed earnings are above last year's reported 
earnings. Monitoring and governance mechanisms may work as constraints on both income-
increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. We investigate the impact of two 
such constraints, namely audit qUality and public ownership. Prior studies (see, for example, 
Becker et a1.  1998, Francis et a1.  1999) indeed report evidence that is supportive of  the 
constraining impact of  audit quality on earnings management, as a lower level of 
discretionary accruals can be observed for firms that appoint Big 6 auditors. The underlying 
rationale is that Big 6 auditors are more competent and/or independene as compared to non 
Big 6 auditors,. and therefore are less tolerant vis-a-vis the level of discretionary accruals 
adopted by IlIlIlS. As all prior studies are based on samples of publicy listed finns, it is 
unknown whether audit quality also works as a constraint on earnings management in non-
listed fIrms. Further, it is also unknown whether public ownership affects earnings 
management behavior and whether it works as a constraint or as an incentive. 
Public ownership may work as an incremental constraint on earnings management 
due to increased scrutiny by market participants on the reported income fIgure. As this may 
increase the probability of  earnings management detection, listed companies can be expected 
to be more reluctant to manage earnings than non-listed companies. However, public 
ownership may also provide an additional incentive to manage earnings opportunistically. The 
rationale is that earnings are managed such that stock market expectations about earnings are 
fulfIlled. Not meeting stock market's expectations may have a negative impact on market 
value through declines in stock prices, which may in turn increase a firm's cost of capital. 
5 Overall, we believe that the impact of  public ownership on earnings management differs 
dependent on whether :fmns have an incentive to smooth income upwards or downwards. 
Hence we formulate separate hypotheses for below and above target firms. 
Hypotheses on constraints on earnings management in  above target firms 
When pre-managed earnings are above target that is, when they are above prior year's 
reported earnings, the income-smoothing incentive induces :fmns (both listed and non-listed) 
to adopt a negative discretionary accruals strategy8. If  audit quality indeed works as a 
constraint on this instance of earnings management, we expect less negative discretionary 
accruals for above target :fmns that are audited by a Big 6 auditor, irrespective of whether 
they are listed or not. However, it is also likely that public ownership in itself constrains 
negative discretionary accruals strategies, meaning that listed firms will be more reluctant to 
decrease earnings than non-listed firms (irrespective of  audit quality). There are at least two 
good reasons for this. First, because stock market scrutiny increases the probability that 
opportunistic earnings management is detected for listed firms. Second, because listed firms 
may want to avoid that earnings expectations are not met as a result from adopting a negative 
discretionary accruals strategy. This is not unlikely, as investors tend to expect a certain 
growth in annual earnings. As a result, we expect that listed firms will engage less in income-
decreasing earnings management than non-listed firms. 
Our reasoning results in the following two hypotheses about constraints on earnings 
management for above target firms: 
6 
HypoTHESIS lA: Audit quality is a constraint on earnings management in firms 
(both listed and non-listed) that have smoothing incentives to adopt a negative 
discretionary accruals strategy. 
HYPOTHESIS IB: Public ownership is a constraint on earnings management infirms 
that have smoothing incentives to adopt a negative discretionary accruals strategy Hypotheses on constraints on earnings management in below target firms 
When pre-managed earnings are below target that is, when they are below prior year's 
reported earnings, the income smoothing incentive enhances both listed and non-listed :ftrms 
to adopt a positive discretionary accruals strategl. If  audit quality differentiation indeed 
exists between Big 6 and non Big 6 audit fIrms, we expect - as in the above target case - that 
audit quality constrains earnings management irrespective of ownership type. We therefore 
hypothesize that the audit by a Big 6 auditor will result in less earnings management, and thus 
for below-target fIrms in less positive discretionary accruals. The impact of  public ownership 
on earnings management is however not so unambiguous in the below target case. Again, two 
forces are likely to have an effect - increased scrutiny on earnings numbers by the market and 
the firm's concern to meet stock market expectations - but they seem to result in conflicting 
predictions as to the earnings management behavior. First, greater scrutiny on the quality of 
earnings numbers reported by listed companies enlarges the probability of  detection of 
earnings management and the costs that come with it. Ceteris paribus, the effect here is that 
listed frrms engage less in positive discretionary accruals strategies than non-listed frrms. 
Second - and on the contrary - listed fIrms face additional earnings expectations from the 
stock market which could motivate them to adopt more pronounced positive discretionary 
accruals strategies as compared to non-listed firms. Since public ownership can work both as 
an incentive and as a constraint on earnings management in below target firms, we expect that 
it has no net observable impact. 
The above reasoning results in the following two hypotheses about constraints on 
earnings management for below target fIrms: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A: Audit quality is a constraint on earnings management in firms 
(both listed and non-listed) that have smoothing incentives to adopt a positive 
discretionary accruals strategy. 
7 HYPO'IHESIS 2B: Public ownership both works as a constraint on and an incentive 
for earnings management infirms that have smoothing incentives to adopt a positive 
discretionary accruals strategy, and therefore has no net impact on earnings 
management. 
3. Sample Selection and Data 
Sample Selection 
From the BelfIrstlO, we selected all industrial and commercial  II fIrms that were listed on the 
Brussels Stock Exchange and published consolidated financial statements (n=52) (see Table 
I). This sample was matched on industry (at least two-digit nace) and size (total assets) with a 
sample of non-listed fIrms. Thirteen companies were deleted as we could not find a matching 
fIrm with consolidated financial statements. For the remaining 39 companies, data of 
consolidated financial statements were obtained for as many years as possible between 1991 
and 1997. For each year included, consolidated fmancial data had to be available for the listed 
as well as its matching company. This resulted in a sample of 352 fIrm-year observations  12. 
The number of  fIrm-observations that was used in the tests is reduced to 136 (that is 62 
companies), because already three years of observations are needed to compute (1) 
discretionary accruals and (2) a proxy for the need for external fmance in the multiple 
regression analysis. Table II gives an overview of the number of firm-year observations and 
companies per industry. 
[Insert Table I and Table II about here] 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table III presents some descriptive statistics on the test and control variables for the full 
sample and the sub-samples of above and below target firms. Panel A (full sample) shows that 
pre-managed earnings are above target in about half of  the sample fIrm-years and that, 
8 consistent with our research design, half of our sample-rIITnS are listed. About two-thirds of 
our sample fIrms (all of which belong to the largest Belgian firms) are audited by Big 6 
auditors. Thirty-five percent of our sample rlfms have a board of optimal sizeJ3, that is, one 
that includes at least 8 but not more than 12 directors. In over 78 percent of our firm-years, 
there was an ex post increase in the sum of rmancial debt and paid-in-capital. A comparison 
of debt versus equity rmancing illustrates that capital raising on debt markets occurs more 
frequently (72 percent of our firm-years) than on stock markets (only about 19 percent). 
About 10 percent of our sample companies are operating in durable goods industries. Panel A 
further shows that operating cash flow amounts to about 9 percent of  lagged total assets. 
Mean (median) total assets are about eight and a half (six) billion BEF. Long-term debt 
financing is on average 16 percent of total assets, while average short-term debt rmancing 
(STCRED) amounts to 10 percent of total assets. As could be expected, non-listed firms are 
somewhat more levered than listed ones (results are not tabulated). The mean and median cost 
of employees amounts to 21 percent of  sales, while the mean and median amount of  purchases 
of raw materials, commercial goods, supplies and services to sales in a particular year is 71 
percent. As could be expected, non-listed rIITnS are somewhat more levered than listed ones 
(results are not tabulated). Tangible rIXed assets increased on average by 7 percent of  prior 
year total assets. 
Panel B and panel C of table III parallel the statistics in panel A. In the above target 
sub-sample somewhat less than 47 percent of the sample rrrm-years belong to listed firms, 
and 70 percent of the firm-years are audited by Big 6 auditors. About 33 percent of the flfm-
years belong to fums with an optimal number of directors, and in 75 percent of  the fum-years 
there is an increase in the total of paid-in capital and rmancial debt. As in the full sample, 
there is a higher incidence of  fund raising on debt (71.66%) than on stock markets (15%). On 
average operating cash flow is somewhat larger, but leverage and firm size are smaller in the 
above target than in the full sample. 
In the below target sub-sample (see panel C of  Table ill), somewhat over half of the 
observations stem from listed firms. Further, about 60 percent of the flfm-years are audited by 
9 Big 6 auditors, and in 38 percent of the cases there is a board of "optimal size", that is the 
number of  directors on the board is at least 8 but not more than 12. In 78.33 percent of the 
cases there was an increase in the total of capital or debt. Also in this sub-sample, debt raising 
(71.66%) occurs more frequently than capital raising (20%). 
[Insert Table III about here] 
4.  Model Specification and Variable Measurement 
In Table IV we report the empirical model that we developed to test the hypotheses proposed 
in Section 2. We argued above that both audit quality and public ownership affect earnings 
management strategies, conditional on whether pre-managed earnings are above or below 
target. Therefore, we ran our regression model on either the sub-sample of above-target and 
below-target firms separately, and will refer to those models as Modell and Model 2, 
respectively. Following prior studies (see, Gaver et al.  1995, Guay et al.  1996, DeFond and 
Park 1997, Subramanyam 1997, Young 1998) we computed pre-managed earnings as this 
year's reported earnings minus discretionary accrualsl4. In the remainder of this section, we 
discuss our measure of earnings management, that is discretionary accruals, and the various 
test and control variables included in our Models 1 and 2. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
Earnings Management Measure 
We focus on earnings management through unexpected or discretionary accruals. The total 
accruals are computed as the change in non-cash working capital, minus depreciation and 
amortisation (of accrued set-up costs, intangible and tangible assets), provisions, write-offs 
and losses on asset disposals. Following DeAngelo (1986, 1994), we then calculate 
unexpected or discretionary accruals as changes in total accruals between the current and the 
previous year scaled by lagged total assetsl5. That is, 
10 (1), 
where: 
DACit = Discretionary accruals for fIrm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets 
TACit = Total accruals for fIrm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. 
Test and Control Variables 
Table IV reports the test and control variables of our empirical model as well as the expected 
sign of the parameters. Our empirical model is as follows: 
DACit =130 + 131TYP~t  +  I3zAUDITit + I3~UDITit*TYPEit  + I3J)IRit + I3sFINit 
+ 136CFit + 137S~t  + I3sLEVit + I3.)NVESTit +  1310SUPit  + 131lEMP~t 
+ 131zSTCREDit + I313DURit + Eit  (2). 
To capture the impact of audit quality on earnings management and thus test for the validity 
of hypotheses lA and 2A, we introduce an indicator variable, AUDIT, which is equal to one 
if  the f"rrm is audited by a Big 6 auditor, and zero otherwise. Prior studies (see, for example 
Becker et al.  1998, Francis et al.  1999) report that Big 6 auditors (which are considered to 
deliver a higher level of audit quality than non-Big 6 auditors) constrain earnings 
management through discretionary accruals. We argued that having a Big 6 auditor constrains 
a frrm's attempt to increase as well as decrease earnings. Therefore, we expect a significant 
positive coefficient on the AUDIT variable in the above target sub-sample (Modell), while 
we expect a significant negative coefficient in the below target sub-sample (Mcx1el 2). 
Next, we intrcx1uce an indicator variable (TYPE) to assess the impact of  ownership 
type on earnings management, and thus to test the validity of hypotheses 1B and 2B. TYPE 
equals one if a f"rrm is listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. We expect a 
positive coefficient on TYPE in Modell (the above target sub-sample). This would indeed be 
consistent with hypothesis lA and would mean that public ownership constrains the adoption 
of negative discretionary accruals strategies, meaning that listed fIrms forego some benefits 
associated with the adoption of  such strategies  16.  Consistent with hypothesis 2B, we do not 
11 expect a significant impact of TYPE in Model 2 (the below target sub-sample), as public 
ownership may as well constrain as induce a positive discretionary accruals strategy. Should 
we, however, observe a significant positive coefficient on TYPE in the below-target sub-
sample, this would be supportive of the 'incentive' impact of public ownership. On the 
contrary, observation of a significant negative coefficient would be supportive of the 
'constraining' impact of  public ownership. Finally, we include the interaction between the 
variables AUDIT and TYPE (AUDIT  *TYPE) in the model, to allow both constraints to have 
an incremental effect over one another and to test for this. 
We also included various control variables in our empirical model. Following prior 
studies, we expect an effective board of  directors (see for example Dechow et al. 1996, 
Beasley et al. 1996) to constrain a firm's earnings management behavior. It is argued in the 
literature that board effectiveness may be influenced by board size. Some argue that a 
sufficient number of  directors is necessary to make a fruitful discussion possible, whereas 
others argue that too high a number does not improve communication (see for example Jensen 
1993). We believe that earnings management may be related to whether boards include an 
'optimal number' of directors. Therefore, an indicator variable, DIR, is included to control for 
the impact of  board size on a firms' earnings management behavior. DIR is equal to one in the 
model if a firm's board is of 'optimal size', that is if  it consists of at least 8 but no more than 
12 directors17, and zero otherwise. As we expect that DIR will constrain earnings management 
strategies, we expect a positive (negative) coefficient when earnings are above (below) target.. 
Next we introduce a variable to control for earnings management by firms that need 
additional external financing. Several prior studies suggest that income-increasing earnings 
management is induced by the need for additional external financing (Dechow et al.  1996) or 
external funds from stock markets (see, for example Shivakumar 1998, Rangan 1998, Teoh et 
al. 1998, Friedlan 1994, Aharonyet al.  1993). To control for this (potential) impact we 
include an indicator variable, FIN. We examine the impact of increases in both bank loans 
and equity financing, since bank loans are an important source of  finance for Belgian firms. 
FIN takes a value equal to one if  there is an increase in external fmance (equity and/or bank 
12 loans) the year subsequent to the year in which earnings are reported (and potentially 
manipulated); it takes the value zero otherwisel8. We expect a positive sign on this coefficient 
in both sub-samples. 
The next control variable we introduce is a performance measure. Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Young (1999) report that the existing accrual expectation models may yield 
measurement error in the discretionary accruals proxy, and hence misspecified tests of 
earnings management for fIrms with extreme fmandal performance. We include cash flow 
from operations (CF) to control for this potential misspecifIcation. As in the above mentioned 
studies, we expect to fmd a negative coefficient on this variable. 
The political cost (size) hypothesis suggests that larger fIrms (that is, fIrms with more 
political visibility) prefer income-decreasing accounting choices. The variable SIZE is 
included to control for this effect. This variable is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assetsI9•20• Theory suggests the coefficient on this variable be negative. 
The next control variable we introduce is the leverage of  the fIrm. We include 
leverage (LEV) to control for discretionary accruals management in highly levered firms and 
motivate this as follows. First, Becker et al. (1998) suggest that leverage can be a proxy for 
potential income-decreasing accruals management in fmns suffering from fmandal distress. 
Second, the debt-equity hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) suggests that high leverage 
works as an incentive for income-increasing earnings management. Since these two 
references stipulate a different relationship between discretionary accruals and leverage, we 
do not propose an expected sign on the coeffIcient of leverage. 
Investments can result in more negative total accruals due to the associated increase 
in depreciation expense. To control for this impact we included a variable, INVEST, that is 
measured by the level of investment in tangible fIxed assets in the year under study (year t) 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of that year (or, alternative t-l). We predict a negative 
coefficient on this variable. 
13 In Section 2 we argued that theory (Trueman and Titman 1988) suggests that firms 
have incentives to srrwoth income to influence terms of trade with various stakeholders such 
as customers, suppliers, employees and short term creditors. Given that ftrrns will avoid 
changes in reported earnings, we also believe that the incentives for (income-increasing and 
income-decreasing) earnings management could be enhanced by the extent to which firms 
depend on implicit contracts with stakeholders. Following Bowen et al. (1995) we include a 
number of variables to control for the impact of various stakeholder relations on earnings 
management. First, we include the ratio of the cost of commercial goods, raw materials, 
supplies and services to sales21, defmed as SUP, to proxy for the extent to which firms depend 
on implicit contracts with their suppliers. The rationale is that implicit contracts with suppliers 
often concern "timely payment and continuing demand for suppliers products" (Bowen et al. 
1995 p. 270). Next, demand for after-sales-services is an example of an implicit contract with 
stakeholders. This demand is likely to be higher in firms that produce durable goods. 
Therefore, we include an indicator variable, OUR, which equals one if  ftrrns operate in the 
durable goods industry, and zero otherwise.22 Third, we also consider implicit contracts with 
employees, and believe that ftrrns' dependence on implicit claims with their employees is 
likely to vary in a firm's labor intensity (Bowen et al.  1995). We include a variable EMPL, 
that is measured by personnel cost23 over sales, as a proxy of labor intensity. Finally, we 
include the variable STCRED, which is the amount of short-term (fmanciaI) debt over total 
assets. This variable serves as a proxy for the extent to which firms depend on implicit 
contracts with short-term creditors. As we expect that implicit contracts are an incentive for 
firms to engage in earnings management strategies, we predict a positive (negative) sign on 
the coefficients of  the implicit contract variables (EMPL, OUR, SUP, and STeREO) for 
below- (above-)target firms. 
14 5. Discussion of  the Results 
Table V reports the results of the OLS estimation of  Modell (above target sub-sample) and 
Model 2 (below target sub_sample)24,25,26. Both models are significant at p < 0.01, and yield 
R2-values of 0.3006 and 0.2858, respectively. In Figure I we graphically present our results on 
the impact of audit quality, public ownership and the interaction between these two factors on 
earnings management for both the above and below target sub-samples. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
[Insert Figure I about here] 
Results for Above-Target Firms: HIA and Hrn 
We find a significant positive coefficient on the AUDIT variable (at p =  0.(017) for the above-target 
sub-sample. This implies that Big 6 auditors constrain earnings management more than non-Big 6 
auditors when firms have incentives to adopt negative discretionary accruals strategies. This evidence 
is supportive of Hypothesis lA, and also indicates that there is audit quality differentiation between Big 
6 and non-Big 6 auditors. Our results further indicate that listed firms decrease earnings less through 
discretionary accruals than non-listed firms (p-value of  TYPE =  0.0046). This confirms our Hypothesis 
lB, and suggestS that public ownership also works as a constraint on income-decreasing earnings 
management. The significant negative coefficient (p=0.0288) on the interaction variable, 
AUDIT*TYPE, and the magnitude of  the coefficients on TYPE (+0.1769), AUDIT (+0.1689) and 
AUDIT*TYPE (-0.1698) indicate that audit quality and public ownership have no incremental effect 
over one another. The results even suggest that a similar magnitude of earnings management occurs in 
listed companies that are audited by a Big 6 auditor, in listed companies that are audited by a non-Big 6 
auditor, and in non-listed companies that are audited by a Big 6 auditor. Only in firms where none of 
the two constraints is active, that is in non-listed firms audited by a non-Big 6 auditor, is there a higher 
level of  income-decreasing earnings management. Figure IT represents the above conclusions. 
The fact that we do not find an incremental constraining effect of  public ownership 
over audit quality or vice versa is consistent with either of the following explanations. First, it 
15 could be that public ownership works as a deterrent on income-decreasing earnings 
management strategies, and consequently the remaining level of earnings management is too 
small for auditors to constrain it even further (that is, it is not material anymore and there is 
nothing for auditors to constrain). Based on their experiences in listed versus non-listed fIrms, 
auditors may even adapt their beliefs (their priors) as to the likelihood of earnings 
management and as a result also adjust audit effort. Second, it could also be that audit quality 
works as a primary constraint on income-decreasing earnings management irrespective of 
ownership type. The audit quality constraint could result from actual adjustments in the 
accruals dictated by the Big 6 auditor after some income-decreasing earnings management 
strategy has been uncovered. Another possibility is that the mere appointment of a Big 6 
auditor works as a deterrent to aggressive earnings management as detection of earnings 
management is costly (for example due to increased audit effort as a result of detection). fu 
case audit quality works as a primary constraint, public ownership only functions as an 
additional constraint for fIrms audited by non-Big 6 auditors. Finally, it could also be that the 
observed level of earnings management in listed companies audited by Big 6 auditors is the 
joint effect of the above scenarios. 
AI> to the control variables, we only find signifIcant parameter coefficients for the 
variables CF (p = 0.0077), SIZE (p = 0.0437), INVEST (p=0.0599). However, the results on 
the SIZE variable contrast the political-visibility hypothesis, as the sign of the variable SIZE 
is opposite to our expectation. However, it is known that size can measure many other things _ 
than political visibility. 
[fusert Figure II about here] 
Results for Below Target Firms: IDA and H2B 
We lack evidence that audit quality functions as a constraint on earnings management when 
firms have incentives to engage in income-increasing earnings management and do not fmd 
evidence supportive of hypothesis 2A. This can be concluded from the insignifIcant parameter 
16 value of the AUDIT variable (p=<).7684) in Model 2. This is an interesting result, as there is 
indication of quality differentiation in the above-target case but not in the below-target case. 
This indicates that Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors offer a similar level of audit quality when 
confronted with income-increasing earnings management strategies. Note that potential losses 
to [mancial statement users are usually higher when their decisions are based on overstated 
earnings as compared to understated earnings. Therefore it is likely that the auditor's business 
risk is higher in case income-increasing-earnings management remains unconstrained. 
Consequently our results could indicate that Big 6 and non-Big 6 (in fact second-tier) auditors 
are generally equally competent at detecting earnings management, but non-Big 6 auditors 
ouly constrain when faced with sufficiently large business risk, whereas Big 6 auditors always 
constrain. This also implies that non-Big 6 auditors are 'less independent' than their Big 6 
counterparts, but only when confronted with income-decreasing earnings management. 
The results on TYPE for the below-target sub-sample are consistent with our 
reasoning in Section 2 that both the 'incentive' and 'constraint' effects of  public ownership 
have an impact of similar size on income-increasing earnings management in below-target 
firms. We derive this from the insignificant p-value of the variable TYPE (p=O.1544) 
indicating an equal level of earnings management between listed and non-listed companies. 
Further is there no significant interaction between audit quality and public ownership (p, 
AUTY= O.6338i7. Overall, the results on TYPE in the below-target sub-sample are 
supportive of hypothesis 2B. 
As to the control variables we find significant results for DIR, FIN and STCRED. 
However, the result on DIR contrasts existing theory as we find a sign opposite to our 
prediction. A possible explanation is that in Belgian firms most directors are representatives 
of the main shareholders who prefer to limit income increases as these may result in 
additional wage demands28. Another interesting result is that income-increasing earnings 
management is lower in years before [mils obtain additional external financing (FIN). This 
suggests firms rather withhold from managing earnings upward too much as they fear 
detection of any income-increasing earnings management, which may have an adverse affect 
17 on the cost of capital and the ability to raise future funds. This result is orthogonal to prior 
Anglo-Saxon evidence (Aharony et al. 1993, Friedlan 1994, Dechow et al. 1996, Rangan et al. 
1998, Teoh et al.  1998) of  income-increasing earnings management before firms go public or 
obtain additional fmancing on equity markets. A potential explanation is that the majority of 
additional finance in our sample is raised on private debt markets whereas prior studies 
concentrate on funds from public stock markets. 
6. Summary and discussion 
In this paper, we examined whether audit quality and public ownership are constraints of 
earnings management and whether there is an incremental constraining effect of  the one 
above the other. We first argued (and tested) that income smoothing is an important incentive 
of earnings management, and that the impact of both constraints is conditional upon the level 
of  pre-managed earnings in fIrms (and hence whether firms have incentives to adopt either an 
income-decreasing or income-increasing earnings management strategy). We developed 
hypotheses on the impact of  both constraints on income-ciecreasing and -increasing earnings 
management. 
There is a clear indication that Big 6 auditors constrain income-decreasing earnings 
management more than non-Big 6 auditors. There is also a clear constraining effect of  public 
ownership for companies audited by non-Big 6 auditors. However, there is no incremental 
effect of  audit quality over public ownership or vice versa, of  public ownership over audit 
qUality. We presented a number of explanations for these findings. First, it could be that 
public ownership reduces earnings management to an acceptable level, so that there is no 
need for higher quality auditors to constrain earnings management of listed companies even 
further. Second, Big 6 auditors may constrain income-decreasing earnings management by 
demanding adjustments or because their appointment works as a deterrent. In this case, public 
ownership does not provide an incremental constraint. Third, reduction in earnings 
management can stem  from the joint effect of these two constraints. 
18 Contrary to our expectation, we do not find evidence that audit quality works as an 
incremental constraint on income-increasing earnings management. But as expected, we can 
not distinguish a (net) constraining impact of  public ownership on income-increasing earnings 
management. We argued that is due to two opposite forces at work in this context. First 
increased scrutiny from stock market participants may work as a deterrent on income-
increasing earnings management. Second, however, the stock market's expectations regarding 
earnings may work as an incentive for income-increasing earnings management. 
Tests of  the constraining impact of  audit quality on earnings management are also 
tests of product differentiation in the audit market. We provide some interesting results that 
are different from but somehow complementary to the existing evidence. First, prior research 
documents evidence of quality differentiation in listed companies (Becker et al. 1998, Francis 
et al. 1999), whereas we only fmd clear evidence of  quality differentiation in non-listed 
companies. We are unable to assess whether lower income-decreasing earnings management 
in listed companies stems from higher quality audits or public ownership. This result is not so 
unusual as it may appear. Assuming that stock market incentives are more important for the 
larger clients of  the listed client segment, our results are in line with evidence documented in 
prior audit fee studies (see, for example, Simunic 1980, Francis and Simon 1987, Palmrose 
1986a, Palmrose 1986b, Simon and Francis 1988). These studies report evidence consistent 
with audit-fee premia for Big 6 auditors in the small-client segment of the audit market. Prior 
evidence on the existence of  audit-fee premia in the large client segment of the audit market is 
however mixed. This suggests that research on the interaction of the Goint) impact public 
ownership and audit quality on earnings management is an interesting area for future research. 
Further, we also only fmd evidence of  product differentiation between Big 6 and 
other auditors when auditors are faced with income-decreasing earnings management. Prior 
research reports evidence of  product differentiation in both income-increasing as well as 
income-decreasing earnings management contexts (Francis et al. 1999), or with income-
increasing earnings management alone (Becker et al. 1998). We argued that our result may 
indicate that Big 6 auditors and second tier auditors are equally competent in detecting 
19 earnings management, but that non-Big 6 auditors decide not to constrain income-decreasing 
earnings management strategies as they involve lower business risk. This may imply that in 
these instances their independence is impaired. 
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24 Table I  Sample selection procedure 
total number of quoted companies with consolidated financial statements  102 
Less 
Holding, financial and insurance companies  50 
total number of  industrial and commercial companies  52 
less 
firms for which there was no match on industry and size with  13 
consolidated financial statements 
total number of  industrial and commercial companies in sample  39 
matching companies  39 
less 
firms for which the listed or its matching one have only 1 or  2 consecutive year(s)  12 
of  consolidated data 
firms for which the listed or its matching one have only 3 consecutive years of  4 
consolidated data 
Total number of companies in sample used in main analysis  62 
Number of firm-year observations per industry used in main analysis  136 
25 Table n number of  companies or firm-year observations (used in main analysis) per 
industry 
I-digit  2-digit  Nace  companies  firm-year 
nace  nace 
code  code  observations 
2  22  production and preliminary processing of metals  10  22 
24  manufacture of  non-metallic mineral products  4  12 
25  chemical industry  8  22 
3  31  manufacture of metal articles  2  2 
32  mechanical engineering  2  4 
34  electrical engineering  2  4 
4  41  food, drink and tabacco industry  4  8 
43  textile industry  2  4 
47  manufacture of  paper and paper products, printing  2  6 
and publishing 
48  processing of  rubber and plastics  2  4 
5  50  general building and civil engineering without  2  4 
specialty 
6  61  wholesale distribution  10  20 
63  agents  2  6 
8  83  activities to banking, financial and insurance  6  12 
84  renting, leasing and hiring of movables  2  4 
9  97  recreational services and other cultural services  2  2 
Total  62  136 
26 Table ill  Desc:riptive statistics on the test and control variables for the full sample and the above and below target sub-samples· 
Panel A Full sample of  listed and 
non-listed fIrms (n=136) 
Categorical variables (proportion 
ofdummy=l) 
AUDIT  66,42 
TYPE  50.00 
DIR  35.07 
FIN"  78.03 
CAPb•e  18.94 
DEBTb•e  71.64 
DEBTCAPb•e  12.78 















































median  3rd quartile 
0.0156  0.0673 
0.0816  0.1281 
15.6265  17.08 
0.1525  0.2446 
0.0564  0.0983 
0.7061  0.8245 
0.2035  0.2672 










Table III Descriptive statistics on the test and control variables for the full sample and the above and below target sub-samples' 
(Cont'd) 
Panel B Above target sub-sample 
(nl=60) 
Categorical variables (proportion 
ofdummy=l) 
AUDIT  70 
TYPE  46.7 
DIR  33.3 
FIN  75 
DEBTb  71.66 
CAPITALb  15 
DEBTCAPb  11.67 




























min  1  st quartile 
-0.7840  -0.1184 
-0.0055  0.0477 
13.2354  14.6148 
0  0.0406 
-0.06655  0.010264 
0.3669  0.5770 
0.0029  0.1193 
0  0.023789 
median  3rd quartile  maximum 
-0.0486  -0.01169  0.0767 
0.0804  0.1288  0.3782 
15.5274  17.0976  19.6379 
0.1326  0.2435  0.6176 
0.05462  0.083067  0.401296 
0.6750  0.8151  1.5263 
0.2068  0.2740  0.5687 
0.069856  0.147201  0.35031 Table III Descriptive statistics on the test and control variables for the full sample and the above and below target sub-samples· 
(Cont'd) 
Panel C Below target sub-sample 
(n2=60) 
































































median  3rd quartile 
0.0673  0.1459 
0.0911  0.1269 
15.5930  16.7302 
0.1671  0.2512 
0.0671  0.1290 
0.7180  0.8107 
0.2073  0.2679 










b  DEBT: dummy which takes the value 1 if a fum had an increase in its long-term fInancial debt in the year after consideration, zero 
otherwise. 
CAP: dummy which takes the value 1 if a fIrm had an increase in its equity financing in the year after consideration, zero otherwise. 
DEBTCAP: dummy that takes the value 1 if a fInn had and increase in its fInancial debt as well as an increase in its equity financing in 
the year after consideration, zero otherwise. 
C number of  variables reduced to 12QJor DAC and 133 for FI1\T,DE~LJ:;.AP J\JIll)J)EBIC.-AP due to missing values 
29 Table IV Specification of  our multiple regression model, variable measurement and 
predictions as to the si2n of  the explanatory variables for Modell and Model 2 
Variable  Definition  Predicted  Predicted 
sign of  sign of 
coefficients  coefficients 
in Modell  in Model 2 
(above target  (below 
sub-sample)  target sub-
sample) 
Dependent variable 
DACit  Discretionary accruals for finn i in year t scaled 




AUDITi•  Dummy, I if  finn i has a BigSix auditor, zero  +  -
otherwise 
TyPE;.  Dummy, I if  finn i is listed, zero otherwise  +  +/-
AUDITit*TYP&.  The interaction of  the dummies TYPEi• and  '!  '! 
AUDIT  it. Takes the value I if  a finn-year 
obervation is of a listed company that is audited 
by a Big 6 auditor, zero otherwise 
Control variables 
DIR;,  Dummy, I if  for finn i in year t number of  +  -
directors on board is at least 8 but no more than 
12, zero otherwise 
FINit  Dummy, I if  for finn i in year t the sum of  +  + 
financial debt and paid-in capital increased in 
the year after the event year, zero otherwise 
CFi•  Operating cash flow for finn i in year t scaled  - -
by lagged total assets 
SIZEi,  Natural logarithm of total assets for finn i in  - -
year t 
lEVi!  Ratio of  long term debt over equity for finn i in  +/- +/-
year t 
INVESTi•  The amount of the increase or decrease in  - -
tangible fixed assets for finn i from year t-I to 
year t, scaled by lagged total assests. 
SUPi!  Cost of  raw materials, commercial goods,  - + 
supplies and service purchased over sales for 
finn i in year t 
EMP4  Cost of  personnel over sales for finn i in year t  - + 
STCREDi•  The amount of  short term financial debt over  - + 
total assets for finn i in year t 
OUR;  Dummy=1 when the firm i operates in the  - + 
durable goods industry 
30 Table V Regression of discretionary accruals on test and control variables in above and below target sub-samples 
Modell  Model 2 
Above target sub-sample  Below target sub-sample 
Variable  Predicted  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  Predicted  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value 
sign  estimate  sign  estimate 
Intercept  -0.7379  -3.477  0.0011  0.4470  1.413  0.1643 
Test variables 
AUDIT  +  0.1769  3.333  0.0017  -0.0127  -0.296  0.7684 
TYPE  +  0.1689  2.976  0.0046  +/- -0.0636  -1.448  0.1544 
AUDIT*TYPE  ?  -0.1698  -2.257  0.0288  ?  0.0305  0.480  0.6338 
Control variables 
DIR  +  -0.0227  -0.614  0.5421  0.0709  1.744  0.0878 
FIN  +  -0.0235  -0.537  0.5940  +  -0.0979  -2.483  0.0167 
CF  0.8517  2.788  0.0077  0.1149  0.376  0.7083 
SIZE  0.0215  2.074  0.0437  -0.0177  -1.329  0.1905 
LEV  +/- 0.1734  1.156  0.2536  +/- -0.1290  -0.962  0.3411 
INVEST  -0.5039  -1.929  0.0599  -0.1685  -1.233  0.2239 
EMPL  0.1448  0.878  0.3846  +  0.0588  0.243  0.8089 
SUP  0.1249  1.054  0.2975  +  -0.0043  -0.022  0.9825 
STCRED  0.0223  0.104  0.9176  +  0.3441  2.274  0.0277 
DUR  -0.0596  -1.230  0.2251  +  0.0198  0.345  0.7318 
R2.  0.3006  0.2858 
F-statistic  2.951  2.817 
P-value of  F-statistic  0.0034  0.0048 
31 32 
FIGURE I: Schematic overvlow of  the Impact of  audit quality (AUDIT) and public o  ........  blp (TYPE) on thelovol of  dlscrotl01lBl'Y _rual. as 
luggOltod by the .....  ults of  the OLS eatlmatlon of  oar Modell and Model 2  (as reparted In Table V) a,b 
Pre-managed earnings 
Above large! companies 
Prior year naporled earnings 














Level of  discretionary accruals for listed companies 
audited by Big Six auditors c 
Level of discretionary accruals for IIslad companies 
audited by Big Six audHors c 
a Arrows Idenlify the dlnaclion of the ImpacJ of audit quality (8lg Six versus Non-Big Six auditors) and a eIock lisling on the level of discretionary accruals 
+: positive ImpacJ on Ihe level of discretionary accruals (bacome mona poaitlve or lass negetlve) 
-: negaliva Impact on the level of discnalionery accrual. (bacome mona negative or lass positive) 
-:  no impact on the level of discretionary accruals 
b This overview only shows the results for lislad companies audltsd by Big  Six audHor. Similar Flguna. can be dnavvn for other three categories of companies, 
thai Is: 11_  companies audited by non-Big Six audHor, non-lIs1ad companies audited by Big Six audHors and non-II_  companies audltad by non-Big Six audllors 
c The flgure only inlands to show the direclion of the Impact of audit qualily and a stock listing on the level of discretionary accruals, and does not Inlend to make any stelaments on the flnal (observed) level 
of discretionary accruals for those companies, since this is also Influenced by various other factors. Figure ll: The impact of audit quality and public ownership on the level of  income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals as suggested by the results of  Modell 
OWNERSHIP 
Public  Private 
relatively lower  relatively lower 
Big Six 
level of  level of 
income-decreasing  income-decreasing 
eamings  eamings 
management  management 
due to public ownership  due to higher audit quality 
and/or 
higher audit quality 
AUDIT QUALITY 
relatively lower  relatively higher 
level of  level of 
income-decreasing  income-decreasing 
eamings  earnings 
Non-Big Six  management  management 
due to public ownership 
33 1 See for example Healy 1985, Gaver et al. 1995, Holthausen et al. 1995, Dechow et al.  1996; 
for bonus plans. DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994, DeAngelo et al. 1994 for debt 
covenants. Bowen et al. 1995, Kasanen et al. 1996 for implicit contracts. 
2 See Aharony et al. 1993, Friedlan 1994, Neill et al. 1995, Subramanyam 1996, Rangan et al. 
1998, Shivakumar et al. 1998, Teoh et al. 1998. 
3 Evidence is reported, for example, in the following studies:  Jones 1991, Guenther 1994, 
Hunt et al. 1996, Key 1997, Han and Wang 1998 
4 Liberty and Zimmerman 1986, DeAngelo 1986, DeAngelo 1988, Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997 
S Warfield et al. 1995, and Rajgopal and Venkatachalem 1998, for the impact of  managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership respectively. Peasnell et al. 1998, Beasley et al. 1996, 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991, DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993, Dechow et al. 1996, Francis et al. 
1999, Becker et al. 1998 for the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms. 
6 In Belgium, all firms that meet certain legal form and size criteria are mandated to file 
financial statements with the Belgian National Bank. 
7 Competence and independence are generally considered as two key dimensions of auditor 
quality. As they are not directly observable, various proxy measures for auditor quality exist 
and tolerance vis-a-vis earnings management is one of  these. 
S Tests reported in footnote 24 indeed support this expectation. 
9 Tests reported in footnote 24 indeed support this expectation. 
10 The Belfirst is a database that contains the financial statement data of all Belgian companies 
that are legally required to file financial statements with the Belgian National Bank. 
11 The total number of  listed firms in 1997 was about 130. 102 of them published consolidated 
financial statements. Holding, financial and insurance companies (50 in total)were deleted as 
their financial statements differ from those of  industrial and commercial companies. 
Classification into industrial and commercial Vs other companies is based on their NACE-
code. The NACE-code is an industry classification chart, which is comparable to the US SIC. 
34 12 Data on board size, auditor type and some items of the consolidated financial statements 
were not available in machine-readible form and so manually collected from the hard copies 
of the firms' consolidated fInancial statements. 
13 Daems (1998) notes that Belgian boards are often too small or too large. Further, the 
Belgian Commission on Corporate Governance recommends board should not include more 
than 12 directors. 
14 In our sample there is 60 out of 120 tirm-year observations with pre-managed earnings 
above prior year reported earnings (above target sub-sample). Likewise, there is 60 
observations with pre-managed earnings below prior year reported earnings (below target 
sub-sample). 
IS Discretionary accrual models have been criticized in the literature (see for example Dechow 
et al. 1995). The early models (Healy 1985 and DeAngelo 1986) do, for example, not control 
for changes in accruals that are due to changes in the fum's economic condition. This can 
result in measurement error in the discretionary accruals proxy. More relmed models (for 
example the Jones and modifIed Jones model) take this into account, but could not be used in 
this study due to data limitations. In particular, time series data are too limited for Belgian 
fIrms, which were only obliged to submit consolidated financial statements from 1991 
onwards. Likewise, the number of  observations per industry is too small as only about 370 
Belgian firms are required to submit consolidated financial statements. We control for any 
potential measurement error by including a measure of fum performance in the multiple 
regression analysis. 
16 Examples of  benefits foregone include amongst others: 1) lower probability of demand for 
higher wages and working conditions, 2) building accounting reserves that enhance the ability 
for earnings management through accounting decisions, and 3) avoiding future earnings 
declines. 
17 We acknowledge that the cut-offs of  this measure are somewhat arbitrary. However, the 
results on the test variables presented in Section 5 of  the paper are insensitive to widening or 
35 tightening the range of the "optimal" number of directors. Neither are the results sensitive to 
including the number of  directors as a continuous measure. 
18 Alternatively we included separate dummy-variables for whether firms have 1) only an ex 
post increase in debt financing (ODEBT=I) or not (ODEBT=O), 2) only an ex post increase in 
equity financing (OCAP=I) or not (OCAP=O) or 3) an ex post increase in equity as well as 
debt financing (DEBTCAP=I) or not (DEBTCAP=O). Results on the test variables are similar 
to those reported in the body of  the text. 
19 We preferred the natural logarithm of  total assets over raw total assets, for plots of 
discretionary accruals against total assets suggest a non-linear relationship between 
discretionary accruals and total assets. 
20 Alternatively, size was measured as the natural logarithm of sales. The results reported in 
Section 5 of the paper are qualitatively similar when the size variable is replaced by this 
alternative measure. 
21 Bowen et aL (1995) use the ratio of a firm's cost of  goods sold to total assets. This measure 
also includes depreciation, amortization and labour expenses.  The format of  Belgian profit 
and loss accounts differs from the American format, in that operating costs are reported 
categorized by the nature of the costs (costs of  purchases of  commercial goods, raw material 
and supplies, costs of  services purchased, costs of  personnel, depreciation and amortization). 
This format allows us to use a less biased proxy for dependence on implicit contracts with 
suppliers. That is, our measure only includes costs related to suppliers. 
22 To identify durable goods industries, we used a similar approach as reported in Bowen et al. 
(1995). In particular, the following industries were classified as durable goods industries: 
Manufacture of  chemicals and allied products, manufacture of metal articles, mechanical 
engineering, manufacture of office machinery an data processing machinery, electrical 
engineering, manufacture of motor vehicles, manufacture of  other means of  transport, 
instruments engineering, manufacture of  floor covering, timber work, wooden furniture, 
building and civil engineering. 
36 23 Again, it is the difference in format of  the Belgian versus American profit and loss accounts 
that allows us to use the cost of  personnel as a proxy for labour intensity. This contrasts the 
rather indirect measure used by Bowen et al. (1995), that is, 1 minus the ratio of tangible fixed 
assets to total assets. 
24 We argued that we expect finns with pre-managed earnings above prior year reported 
earnings to decrease, whereas finns with pre-managed earnings below prior-year reported 
earnings to increase earnings. Further we expect that the impact of  a stock listing or of audit 
quality will depend on whether finns face incentives to increase or decrease reported 
earnings. Since this can be considered a precondition to our further analysis we performed 
some univariate tests to examine whether our expectations as to the direction of  earnings 
management by firms with pre-managed earnings above (below) prior year reported earnings 
indeed holds. First, we examined and found that mean and median discretionary accruals are 
significantly positive (negative) in the sub-sample off"mn-years with pre-managed earnings 
below (above) prior year reported earnings, that is the below (above)-target sub-sample. 
Further, a chi-square test for independence indicates that the proportion of  positive (negative) 
discretionary accruals is significantly higher in the below (above) target sub-sample. Third, a 
t-test for differences in means and Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences in medians 
indicates that mean and median discretionary accruals are significantly lower in the above 
than in the below target sub-samples. 
A similar research design was followed by DeFond and Park (1997) and Gaver et al. (1995). 
As pointed out in those studies, selection bias may be a concern. Following DeFond and Park 
(1997) we tested the sensitivity of our results to this potential mis-specification by 
partitioning our sample based on proxies for above and below target firms, which are not 
influenced by our estimate of  discretionary accruals. First, we used the change in post-
managed (that is reported) earnings to partition finns in above and below target companies. 
Second, we used the change in operating cash flow to distinguish firms that have incentives to 
increase income to avoid decreases in reported income from firms that have incentives to 
37 decrease income to avoid increases in reported income. Results of a Chi-square test of 
independence of  our partitioning variable and the sign of  discretionary accruals confirm these 
predictions. 
25 Alternatively we ran a pooled regression on the firm-year observations with pre-managed 
earnings above and below prior year reported earnings, in which we allowed the intercept as 
well as the coefficients of  the explanatory variables to differ between the above and below 
target sub-samples. We included a dummy variable (SMOOTH) that indicates whether firms 
have pre-managed earnings above prior year reported earnings (SMOOTH=1) or pre-managed 
earnings below prior year reported earnings (SMOOTH=O). Further, we allowed different 
coefficients between above and below target firm-year observations by multiplying each 
explanatory variable with two dummy variables. That is, first each explanatory variables was 
multiplied by a dummy (ABOVE) that takes the value 1 if  pre-managed earnings were above 
prior year reported earnings, and zero otherwise. Next, each explanatory variable was also 
mUltiplied by an indicator variable (BELOW) that takes the value 1 when pre-managed 
earnings are below prior year reported earnings, zero otherwise. This way, we allowed 
different coefficients on each explanatory variable in our model for the above and below 
target sub-samples. Results of  this pooled regression are qualitative similar to those reported 
in the body of  the text. 
We also ran a pooled regression with the inclusion of  SMOOTH and all interactions between 
the explanatory variables and SMOOTH. Results indicate that the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables generally differ between the above and below target sub-samples. 
26 Examination of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIP's) of  Model 1 and Model 2, suggests 
our results are NOT distorted by multicollinearity. 
27 Recall that two thirds of our full sample irrms are audited by Big 6 auditors. This holds also 
for the sub-samples of  listed and non-listed companies respectively. That is, there is no higher 
incidence of  being audited by a Big 6 audit firm for listed as compared to non-listed 
companies.  (p-value of  chi-square for independence = 0.855). 
38 28 Anglo-Saxon studies focus on the role of the board in mitigating the conflict of  interest 
between owners and shareholders. In Anglo-Saxon countries a major concern is then also that 
management potentially overrides the board, and so reduces its effectiveness. Agency 
conflicts between owners and managers are less of a concern in Belgian companies where 
ownership is more concentrated. In those companies board of directors should rather mitigate 
a potential agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders. The concern is then 
also a potential override of  the board by majority shareholders. To this end, corporate 
governance rules recommend boards should include a sufficient number of  independent 
directors. Firms are not obliged to disclose in the fmancial statements information about the 
number of  majority shareholders or independent directors on the board. We were so not able 
to directly assess whether our results on the board size variable directly result from (1) boards 
lacking a sufficient number of  independent directors and so (2) majority shareholders 
overriding the board. 
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